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NOTES
MAY A CANCELLATION OF INDEBTEDNESS BE INCOME
TO THE CREDITOR? Commissioner v. Fender Sales, Inc.'
From the time that the income tax was first levied under the sixteenth amend-
ment, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has taken the position that cancella-
tion of indebtedness may result in taxable income to the debtor.2 The simplest case
is that used as an example in the current Treasury Regulations. If a debtor per-
forms services for his creditor, and in return the creditor cancels the debt, the
debtor has realized income in the amount of the debt. The courts at first refused
to accept this theory, and in the early cases held that the debtor did not "realize"
taxable income from the cancellation. 4 The scope of the concept of income seems
to have been restricted to some tangible gain out of which the tax could be paid.
The United States Supreme Court adopted the Commissioner's position in
1931 in United States v. Kirby Lumber Co.5 The taxpayer had issued bonds at
par value, then later in the same tax year purchased some of the bonds on the
open market for less than par value. Justice Holmes' very short opimon states that
a clear gain was realized because the dealings made available "assets previously
offset by the obligation of bonds now extinct."
6
The issue of the tax results of cancellation of indebtedness has been widely
discussed since the decision of Kirby.7 The courts have reached a number of dif-
ferent results from the multitude of fact situations presented by the cases. For
example, the benefit flowing to the debtor may result in increase in net worth, 8
compensation for services,9 a taxable dividend,1o a reduction in purchase price of
property," a gift,i 2 or a contribution to corporate capital.13 This note will be
primarily concerned with the last: the creditor's contribution of the debt to the
debtor's capital.
Treasury Regulations section 1.61-12(a) states that discharge of indebtedness
may result in realization of income, giving the example stated above. It goes on:
1338 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
2 Treas. Reg. 33, art. 135 (1913); expanded by Treas. Reg. 45, art. 544 (1918)
and Treas. Reg. 45, art. 51 (1921).
3 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(a) (1957).
4 See Bumet v. John F Campbell Co., 50 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1931) and cases
cited therein.
5 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
old. at 3.
7 See, e.g., Darrel, Discharge of Indebtedness and the Federal Income Tax, 53
HAav. L. REv. 977 (1940); Surrey, The Revenue Act of 1939 and the Income Tax
Treatment of Cancellation of Indebtedness, 49 YALE L.J. 1153 (1940); Warren & Sugar-
man, Cancellation of Indebtedness and its Tax Consequences (pts. 1-2), 40 CoLUm. L.
REv. 1326 (1940), 41 COLum. L. Bxv. 61 (1941).
8 United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
9 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
10 Fitch v. Helvering, 70 F.2d 583 (8th Cir. 1934).
11 Hirsch v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1940).
i2 Helvermg v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943).
13 Commissioner v. Auto Strop Safety Razor Co., 74 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1934).
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"In general, if a shareholder m a corporation which is indebted to him gratuitously
forgives the debt, the transaction amounts to a contribution to the capital of the
corporation to the extent of the principal of the debt." The first important case
on this point was Commisswner v. Auto Strop Safety Razor Co.' 4 En that case,
one subsidiary corporation accrued debts for royalties, loans, and interest owing
to another subsidiary of its parent corporation. The creditor was liquidated and
all its assets were assigned to the parent corporation, which was the sole share-
holder of the debtor. The Second Circuit held the subsequent cancellation of the
entire debt to be a contribution to the capital of the debtor, and therefore not
taxable as income to the debtor.15 Apparently, no significance was placed upon
the fact that part of the debt represented the principal of a loan and the rest
was incurred as expenses of interest and royalties.
In 1940 the Eighth Circuit made a distinction between debts of principal and
interest. In Helvering v. lane Holding Corp.16 a trust, sole shareholder of the
debtor corporation, cancelled accrued interest debt so it could make distributions
to beneficiaries. The trust instrument provided no distributions could be made
while there were outstanding interest debts. It was held by application of the
"tax benefit" rule that the cancellations were taxable income to the debtor.17
The taxpayer bad enjoyed the tax benefit of deductions for expenses in the amount
of the interest as it was accrued-expenses which it was never required to pay.
In order to recoup this tax previously avoided, the interest debt cancelled was
treated as taxable income to the debtor, and not as a contribution to capital. It
should be noted here that the stockholder-creditor reported income on a cash
basis, and therefore had never reported the interest as income as it was never paid.
The question whether the cancellation of expense indebtedness is to be treated
as income to the debtor corporation came before the Second Circuit again in
Carroll-McCreary Co. v. Commssioner.18 Three shareholders cancelled salary
debts accrued and owing to them from the corporation. The corporation was in-
solvent, and the debts were forgiven pursuant to an agreement made by the
shareholders with its creditors for extension of time on other debts of the corpora-
tion. The amount of the debts cancelled was held to be a contribution to capital,
not taxable income to the debtor.1 9 The creditors had reported income using the
accrual method, and had included the salaries in their gross income for the years
in which they were accrued.
It would seem that the result of Carroll-McCreary could have been reached
on other grounds. Prior cases had established generally that there is no income
realized if the debtor is insolvent both before and after the cancellation of in-
debtedness.20 Since Carroll-McCreary Co., Inc. was insolvent both before and
after the debt was cancelled, the decision that it realized no taxable income could
have been reached without ever discussing the fact that the creditor was a share-
14 Ibid.
is Id. at 227.
10 109 F.2d 933 (8th Cir. 1940).
17 Id. at 941-42.
18124 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1941).
19 Id. at 305.
2 0 E.g., Dallas Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 95
(5th Cir. 1934).o
holder. Nonetheless, the case has been regarded as binding precedent for the
rule that indebtedness cancelled by a stockholder of the debtor corporation is a
nontaxable contribution to capital.21 Such a rule ignores the fact that the debtor
may have received a "tax benefit" from the prior deductions of the debts as ex-
penses-expenses which were never paid. This rule opens a tax loophole. in cases
where the debtor uses the accrual method for reporting its income, and the credi-
tor reports income using the cash method. This loophole is particularly available
where the debtor is a closely held corporation. By accruing salaries to shareholder-
employees, the corporation is able to take advantage of sizable tax deductions.
Payment of these expenses can be postponed indefinitely, or in a later year the
creditor-shareholder may forgive the debt and treat it as a contribution to capital.
The net result is a neat avoidance of income tax on otherwise taxable gains.
Congress partially closed this loophole in 193722 by refusing to allow a deduc-
tion if the expense or interest was not actually paid within two and one-half
months after the close of the tax year of the debtor, and if the expense was not
includible in the gross income of the creditor m the same tax year that it was
accrued by the debtor. This provision applies only where the creditor owns or
controls more than fifty per cent of the outstanding stock of the debtor, or where
there are certain other relationships between the debtor and creditor. Where the
creditor owns fifty per cent or less of the stock, this statute does not apply.
Tis tax loophole problem was raised in Commissioner v. Fender Sales, Inc.23
Fender Sales, Inc., hereinafter called Sales, is a Califorma corporation organized
primarily to distribute the products of Fender Instrument Co., Inc. At the time
of the transactions involved in the case, Sales' outstanding stock was distributed
fifty per cent each to C. Leo Fender and Donald D. Randall. Fender and Randall
were also employees of Sales, with salaries previously set at 15,000 dollars per
year each, plus one per cent and four per cent, respectively, of annual sales.
Sales had always been solvent, but from its inception it had been plagued by
a shortage of cash. This financial predicament was caused by a requirement that
it pay for its purchases upon receipt from the manufacturer, while it was often
required to extend credit to its own customers. The cash shortage induced Fender
and Randall to forbear drawing their salaries for fiscal years 1954-1956. Sales
accrued the salaries on its books and deducted the 30,000 dollars as expenses on
its income tax returns for those years. Fender and Randall, using the cash basis,
reported no income from the salaries in the years they were accrued by the
corporation.
In 1955 Sales found its working capital so low it turned to bank financing
for additional cash. Originally, the bank did not ask for security, but later required
the subordination of other liabilities to the notes, and personal guarantees on the
notes from the corporate officers. In addition, it became concerned about the out-
standing salary obligations, which by 1956 had reached a total of 90,000 dollars.
The bank believed these liabilities may represent potential priority claims over its
claim, so suggested the liabilities be capitalized.
21 Commissioner v. Fender Sales, Inc., 338 F.2d 924, 933 (9th Cir. 1964) (dis-
senting opinon).22 Iut. Rev. Code of 1936, § 24(a), as amended, ch. 815, § 301(c), 50 Stat. 828
(1937) (now INr. Rnv. CoDE OF 1954 § 267(a)(2)).
23338 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1964), cart. dented, 381 U.S. 935 (19Q5).
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To comply with the bank's request, Sales issued additional stock to Fender
and Randall, on a dollar-for-dollar exchange for salary debt. Thus Fender and
Randall each received 450 shares of 100 dollar par value stock and cancelled
45,000 dollars of salaries owed to them. In 1958 another 150 shares of 100 dollar
par value stock was issued to Fender and Randall each in discharge of 15,000
dollars of salaries accrued to each in 1957. Neither Fender nor Randall included
these transactions in hls income tax returns for 1956 and 1958, and Sales did not
report any income resulting from the cancellation of these salary debts. The Com-
missioner took the position that the receipt of stock constituted taxable salary
income to Fender and Randall, or in the alternative, that Sales realized taxable
income upon the cancellation of the salary debt.
24
The Tax Court held that the transaction did not result in taxable income
either to Fender and Randall or to Sales. 25 Its opinion was that the issuance of
additional shares in proportions equal to their original interest in the corpora-
tion did not constitute a taxable gain to Fender and Randall. Rather, the trans-
action was held analogous to a stock dividend, and within the rule of Eisner v.
Macomber28 that a stock dividend is not "income" within the taxing power con-
ferred by the sixteenth amendment. 27 As to the tax liability of Sales, the Tax
Court followed the prior cases in holding the gratuitous forgiveness by a share-
holder of the corporation's debt was a non-taxable contribution to capital. 28
The Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and held that Fender and Randall
realized taxable income in the tax years in which the additional stock was issued
to them.29 The court rejected the contention of the taxpayers and the holding of
the Tax Court that because the stock ownership percentage of Fender and Randall
remained equal after the additional stock was issued, they received nothing which
they did not already possess; i.e., the entire capital stock of Sales. The majority
believed the case within Treasury Regulations section 1.61-2(d) (4), which pro-
vides: "[I]f a corporation transfers its own stock to an employee as compen-
sation for services, the fair market value of the stock at the time of transfer shall
be included in the gross income of the employee " The Eisner stock dividend
situation was said to be "not even apposite."30 When a stock dividend is made, the
net worth of the corporation, excluding capital accounts as liabilities, is not
changed. The stockholders retain an equal interest in the same investment. But in
Fender Sales, "the stockholders have retained an equal interest in a substantially
different investment."s1 The net worth of Sales was increased by 120,000 dollars.
The interests of Fender and Randall substantially increased in value and they re-
ceived a gain constituting income taxable under the sixteenth amendment.
With respect to the tax effect of the transaction to Sales, the debtor, the Tax
Court's holding was affirmed. The Court of Appeals agreed that the prior cases,
CarroU-McCreary and Auto Strop, have established a controlling precedent for
24 Id. at 926.
2522 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 550 (1963).
26 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
27 Ad. at 219.
28 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 562.
29 338 F.2d at 929.
80 Id. at 927.
s1 Ibid.
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the rule that cancellation by a shareholder of debts owed hun by his corporation
must be treated as nontaxable contributions to capital.
The basic issue presented by this case is whether either of the parties realized
a taxable gain from the transaction. At first glance this appears to be a simple case
of payment of salaries with stock rather than money; indeed the court based its
decision on this theory. The complication is that equal shareholders received
equal amounts of additional stock. Before the transaction Fender and Randall
each owned fifty per cent of the outstanding stock in Sales, and after the trans-
action they each still owned fifty per cent. Neither has increased his proportionate
ownership in the corporation. The situation thus presented is quite similar to that
of a stock dividend. The distinction made by the court between this case and
the Eisner stock dividend is that here the value of the shareholders' interest in the
corporation actually increased, due to increase in the net worth of the corporation
from the cancellation of a part of its liabilities. This distinction needs further
examination.
The book value of a shareholder's equity in a corporation increases with any
increase in net worth of the corporation. But such increases in the value of a
shareholder's interest are ordinarily not recognized as a taxable gain to the share-
holder until he "realizes" income by some tangible event, such as payment of a
dividend other than a stock dividend, or by selling the shares at a profit.32 As
Judge Barnes points out in Ins dissenting opinion, Fender and Randall mght have
contributed their services to Sales without any provision for salaries. The net worth
of the corporation would have increased as a result of their efforts, and the value
of their stock in the corporation would have increased. But they would not have
"realized" any income, and would not be subject to tax on this gain. 83 The
majority opinion distinguishes that situation from the case under consideration on
the ground that in the case there was a present, not an antecedent, increase in
the net worth of the corporation as a result of the discharge of its salary debts.
The court held that where additional stock is issued to shareholders in discharge
of salary debts, the event is sufficient for the resulting increase in the net worth
of the corporation to constitute a "realization" of income by the shareholders
within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment. Therefore, section 61 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and Treasury Regulations section 1.61-2(d) are
applicable and Fender and Randall are subject to tax on the stock notwithstanding
the fact that their proportionate interest in the corporation was not increased.
The taxpayers had argued: first, the receipt by equal stockholders of equal
additional shares, without more, is not a taxable event; second, the cancellation
of a debt does not constitute taxable income to the creditor; and therefore, the
simple combination of the two in a single transaction does not generate a taxable
event. The court could easily have dismissed this contention on the ground that
the case involved was a single event-the discharge of a salary debt by issuance
of additional shares of stock-which the court holds to be a taxable event. But
the court did not stop there. It went on to say, "We are not prepared to hold
that the voluntary surrender or forgiveness by a taxpayer of a receivable which,
if collected, would represent taxable income, is, in all circumstances, a non-
taxable event."3
4
82 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 214 (1920).
3 338 F.2d 924, 931 (9th Cir. 1964) (dissent).
84 338 F.2d at 928.
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It appears that the court went out of its way to discuss the cancellation of
indebtedness issue in order to give its answer to a question not actually presented
by the case. That is the question of the tax effects of a voluntary cancellation by a
shareholder of his corporation's debt which would be income to him if paid. If
Fender and Randall had merely cancelled the salary debts without taking more
stock in exchange, the net worth of the corporation would have made the same
increase as it did in the case before the court. The value of the shareholders'
interest would also increase by the same amount. The question would then be
whether the cancellation of the salary debt constitutes a realization of taxable
income to either the debtor corporation or the creditor shareholder. If the trans-
action is not treated as income to either of the parties, then a simple device for
tax avoidance is available whenever the corporate employer uses the accrual
method for reporting income and its shareholder-employee uses the cash method
for reporting income and owns fifty per cent or less of the stock in the corpo-
ration. Under such circumstances, the corporation may accrue salaries to its
shareholder-officers and deduct these salaries as operating expenses in the year
accrued. These salaries will not be included in the income of the employee be-
cause they are not paid. In a subsequent tax year the employee will cancel the
debts. The net effect will be that the corporation has received tax-free income
to the extent of the salary deductions.
The most realistic and reasonable solution would seem to be that of recogniz-
ing income to the corporation. The court believes existing case law precludes this
solution and requires that the corporation treat the cancellation as a nontaxable
contribution to capital. Thus the court would stretch the "dommion and control"
theory of Helvenng v. Hors 5 to impose tax liability on the shareholder-
employees, in a case where no stock is issued in exchange for the cancellation of
their salary claim. Its theory is that since the creditor benefitted the debtor by
relinquishing his rights, the creditor has exercised dominion and control over the
disposition of assets to such an extent as to amount to "realization of income."
That reasoning is sound as applied in Horst. There the owner of coupon bonds
gave the coupons to his son, then contended the interest paid on the coupons
was income to the donee. The United States Supreme Court held the income
taxable to the donor, stating that the income tax applies "to income derived from
interest or compensation when he who is entitled to receive it makes use of his
power to dispose of it in procuring satisfactions which he would otherwise pro-
cure only by the use of the money when received."86 The Ninth Circuit felt that
the shareholder-creditors would have "more surely 'realized" for their own benefit
the value of the obligations discharged than did Horst in his gift of interest
coupons to his son."
7
But in the creditor-shareholder case, the creditors would not have diverted
their assets to anyone else. In effect, they have merely changed the form of their
assets from a receivable to a capital interest. If a gain is actually realized later,
they will still be the persons who realize it and who will be taxed on it.
If they receive no stock, they as individuals have had no increase in net worth
at the time of the cancellation of their claims. If anything their net worth is de-
creased. The salary debt had a priority at least equal to that of other unsecured
85 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
83 Id. at 119.
87 338 F.2d at 929.
May, 19661 NOTES
claims, and would be paid along with the clamis of general creditors if the cor-
poration were forced to liquidate. But as shareholders, their assets are subjected
to the future success or failure of the corporation. After their salary claims are
cancelled, it becomes less certain how much gain will ever be realized. They
would receive nothing from a liquidation until all creditors have been paid.
Instead of stretching Horst, a more realistic view would be to apply the tax
benefit rule of Jane, 8 in a case where the stockholder employee has not received
shares for the cancellation of his salary clain. Since the corporation has had the
benefit of deductions for the salaries which now will never be paid, it is just
and equitable to require it to pay the tax previously avoided. This is in effect
treating the cancellation as a rescission of the agreement to pay salaries.
It has been thought that Jane was overruled and the view of Carroll-McCreary
implicitly adopted by the Supreme Court in Helverng v. American Dental Co.39
In that case the creditor, who was not a shareholder of the debtor corporation,
forgave debts for rent and interest. The forgiveness was held not taxable as in-
come to the debtor corporation, notwithstanding tax benefits from prior deduction
of the expenses from gross income, on the theory that the transaction constituted
a gift. A gift by a creditor with no proprietary interest in the debtor differs sub-
stantially from a stockholder's cancellation of his corporation's debt, made to en-
hance the capital position of the corporation. In the gift case, the creditor has
diverted his assets to some third person. In the shareholder's case the creditor's
asset is not diverted, but merely changed in form. The holding of American
Dental does not necessarily apply to the situation presented where the creditor is
also a shareholder, as in Fender Sales, nor to a situation where a shareholder-
employee cancels his salary claim without receiving stock or other compensation
in exchange.
It would not be rational in every case automatically to treat a gratuitous
cancellation of indebtedness by a shareholder of the debtor corporation as a con-
tribution to capital. A noted authority 40 suggests the example of three creditors
who forgive debts owed them by a corporation. If one had a small holding of
the corporation's stock, but the other two had none, it should not be proper to
hold the shareholder's cancellation as a contribution to capital, while the others'
cancellations are treated as taxable income or gifts. No fixed rule can properly
be applied to all the possible fact situations.
In the specific situation presented when the creditor has not treated the debt
as income when accrued, it seems more rational to treat the cancellation as a
retroactive rescission of the original agreement to pay salary, interest, or whatever
expense was involved. A similar approach has been taken in related cases. For
example, where the debt was incurred in a sale of property, the subsequent can-
cellation was treated as a retroactive reduction in the purchase price.4 ' And where
bonds were issued as dividends on common stock, a subsequent purchase by the
issuer on the open market at less.than face value was treated as a reduction in
the amount of the dividend distributed, rather than as income to the debtor.42
88 Helvenng v. Jane Holding Corp., 109 F.2d 933 (8th Cir. 1940).
89 318 U.S. 322 (1943).40 Surrey, The Revenue Act of 1939 and the Income Tax Treatment of Cancellation
of Indebtedness, 49 YALE: L.J. 1153, 1171 (1940).
41 Hirsch v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1940).
4 2 Commissioner v. Rail Joint Co., 61 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1932).
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It would be appropriate similarly to treat the shareholder's voluntary annulment
of his claims against the corporation as a reduction in the amount previously
agreed upon to be paid for Ins services or for the use of his property.
The theory just stated is consistent with the shareholder's intent when he re-
leases the debt. He has found the corporation unable to pay the debt, and in
financial difficulty because it was incurred in the first place. He is now able to
see that both parties would be better off if they had originally made some other
arrangement. That other arrangement can be simply made by a rescission of the
original agreement and annulment of the accrued debt. By requiring the debtor
to make up the tax avoided by taking prior deductions, all parties will be restored
to the status quo ante.
In Auto Strop and Carroll-McCreary it was proper to treat the cancellation as
a contribution to capital. There was no opportunity for tax avoidance, as the
creditor, using the accrual method, had reported the salary as income in the years
it was accrued and had been taxed upon it. In such a case rescission is not pos-
sible because the creditor cannot get back the money he has paid to the govern-
ment as tax. He must give up that amount, and to that extent is actually
contributing more of his assets to the corporation.
In contrast to this situation, we have the situation presented in Jane. There
the creditor used the cash method for reporting income, and had not reported
the debts as income in the years in which they accrued. The debts were for in-
terest and had been deducted by the debtor as expense in the year accrued. The
court taxed the debtor on the cancellation, applying the tax benefit rule, rather
than holding that the cancellation constituted a realization of income by the
creditor. This case would provide authority for a holding that the cancellation
of salary debts by shareholders results in taxable income to the debtor corporation
to the extent of the tax benefit, rather than contributions to capital and a reali-
zation of income by the creditor.
This result may not be any more or less just than that stated by the court in
Fender Sales. The government is going to collect a tax either way. But it takes
a more realistic view of the effect of the transaction on both the creditor and the
debtor. It does not require fine legal theories as to what constitutes "realization"
of taxable gain. It does not require the apparently illogical holding that the can-
cellation of a debt constitutes income to the creditor, who in fact receives no
present gain. And it would free the businessman to reorganize his business ac-
counts to correct prior mistakes which may in some cases determine the success
or failure of the enterprise. At the same time, the state of the law on this subject
would be clarified, and a potential loophole for improper tax avoidance would be
closed. As the situation now stands, a closely held corporation may still be able
to avoid income tax if the corporation reports income on the accrual method and
accrues expense debts to shareholders who hold fifty per cent or less of its out-
standing stock and report income on the cash method. If the dictum in Fender
Sales is followed the creditor will be assessed an income tax on a debt he has
forgiven-on gain he has never received.
Thomas P Kendnck*
*Member, Third Year Class.
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